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Explanations for the Predominant Use of Cash Financing  
in Hospitality Acquisitions 
 
Abstract 
Seventy-five percent of hospitality acquisitions were cash-financed from 1980 
to 2000.  In other industries this figure has been closer to 43%.  Since the choice of 
cash versus stock financing can have a significant effect on a hospitality acquire‘s 
capital structure, the purpose of this study was to examine possible explanations for 
the high level of cash financing used in hospitality acquisitions.  The results indicate 
that in both the hotel and restaurant industries, the use of cash payments in acquisi-
tions is positively related to the acquiring firm’s debt ratio.  Firm size is also posi-
tively related to the use of cash payments but only in the restaurant industry.  Free 
cash flow and internal growth opportunities do not appear to be significant 
determinants of the use of cash payments in acquisitions in the hospitality industry. 
 
Key words: acquisition, free cash flow, growth opportunity
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Explanations for the Predominant Use of Cash Financing  
in Hospitality Acquisitions 
 
Introduction 
Hospitality studies (Canina, 2001; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000) have used event 
studies to measure market gains/losses around a hospitality firm’s acquisition an-
nouncement.  However, payment type in the acquisition process has not been ex-
plained except with regard to insider trading (Oak and Andrew 2005).  During the 
twenty-year period from 1980 to 2000, cash was the dominant method of payment in 
hospitality acquisitions (see Table 1).  Cash payments were used in 75% of hospitality 
acquisitions while stock financing was used in only 14% of acquisitions (the remain-
ing 11% were financed with a mix of cash and stock).  When acquisitions for all in-
dustries were categorized by the method of payment used during the same twenty-
year period, cash represented only 43% of total acquisition financing while stock rep-
resented 34% (Rhodes-Krof and Viswanathan, 2004).  Cash is a valuable resource to a 
firm but also is costly to maintain (with generally lower rates of return than the firm’s 
other, hospitality-focused investments).  It is important to understand why the hospi-
tality industry depends predominantly on raising and using cash to finance its acquisi-
tions.  In this study we used the hotel and restaurant industry as the hospitality indus-
try since hotel and restaurant companies are the main players in the eating & drinking, 
hotel, amusement & recreation, and water transport industry.  The purpose of this 
study was to examine factors that may contribute to the predominant use of cash fi-
nancing in acquisitions in the hospitality industry.   
In contrast to this study, the previous hospitality acquisition literature has fo-
cused primarily on wealth gains associated with an acquisition announcement (Canina, 
2001; Kwansa, 1994; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000) rather than the way the acquisition was 
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financed.  Oak and Andrew (2005) used a market microstructure analysis to examine 
the relationship between informed trading and the payment type offered by a hospital-
ity acquirer, but the study did not analyze the effect of other firm characteristics on the 
payment type decision.  In another study related to hospitality financing, the relation-
ship between debt and growth opportunities (Dalbor and Upneja, 2004) was analyzed.  
Our study differs from these studies because we look specifically at the issue of the 
choice of financing payment type in relation to specific firm characteristics that might 
logically have relevance to the payment type chosen in an acquisition. 
 
Literature Review 
 The literature on acquisitions and the associated payment type offered by an 
acquirer suggests that the type of offer chosen (cash, mixed, or stock) may be related 
to the acquirer’s free cash flow, the acquirer’s use and level of debt financing, the lev-
el of the acquirer’s other growth opportunities, and the acquirer’s size.  We explore 
the connection between these characteristics in the following discussion. 
 
Free Cash Flow and the Use of Cash Financing 
Free cash flow has been postulated as having an influence on the use of cash 
financing in acquisitions (Jensen, 1988; Martin, 1996).  Free cash flow is defined as 
net firm cash flow in excess of that required to fund all positive net present value pro-
jects (Jensen, 1988).  It is possible that large amounts of free cash flow lead firms to 
finance acquisitions with cash.  Martin (1996) presented a univariate analysis that re-
vealed a significant positive linear relationship between the use of cash financing and 
the free cash flow of acquiring firms.  His analysis, however, did not control for other 
characteristics of individual firms such as growth opportunities, debt ratio, and size.  
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Additional evidence on the relationship between free cash flow and the type of pay-
ment offered in an acquisition is sketchy.  Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) and Har-
ford (1999) showed that cash-rich firms are more likely to be bidders even for value-
deceasing acquisitions but they did not specifically look at whether cash or stock was 
used to pay for the acquisition.  Hence, it is possible that cash-rich firms are more 
likely bidders for acquisitions but still choose to pay for the acquisition with stock.  
This might occur if, for some reason, being cash-rich better enables a firm to obtain 
general financing in the future. 
Further support for the role of free cash flow and the resulting cash accumula-
tion as a factor in the choice of payment type in an acquisition has been suggested by 
Bruner (1988), who found that successful bidders in acquisitions already had financial 
slack in their cash holdings two to three years prior to a merger announcement.  Eis-
inger (2005) suggested that firms accumulate cash in order to generate financial slack 
and gain the ability to escape future capital market constraints.  However, this still 
does not answer the question of whether this would lead a firm to finance current ac-
quisitions with cash (they may want to husband their cash for the future purposes 
stated above). 
 Hence, there is no clear-cut relationship in the literature between the level of 
a firm’s free cash flow and cash holdings and its use of cash in a current acquisition.  
This study empirically investigated this issue in the context of hospitality firm acqui-
sitions. 
 
H 1: There is a significant positive relationship between the acquirer’s use of cash 
financing in an acquisition and the level of the acquirer’s free cash flow. 
Justification:  Acquiring firms with more free cash flow may be more likely than ac-
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quiring firms with low free cash flow to use cash payment in an acquisition due to the 
ready availability of cash  
 
The Relationship between Cash Payment Offers and Debt  
One explanation for the payment type utilized in financing acquisitions is the 
pecking order theory, which suggests that investments are financed using internal 
funds first, new issues of debt second, and new issues of equity last in order to use the 
cheapest financing source possible (Brealey and Myers, 2001).  In applying the peck-
ing order theory to acquisition payment type offers, one would expect to see cash of-
fers (even if financed by debt) significantly exceed stock offers.   
There may also be other reasons to prefer the use of cash raised through debt fi-
nancing rather than using stock payments to finance hospitality acquisitions.  Manag-
ers may prefer to issue debt to raise cash rather than issue new equity under condi-
tions of asymmetric information where managers have better knowledge about the 
firm’s future value than outside investors.  Managers may also avoid issuing both un-
dervalued and overvalued shares in order to avoid signaling share overvaluation (Lee, 
1997; Myers, 1984).  Dalbor and Upneja (2004) provided evidence that managers, in 
general, prefer debt to equity in the lodging industry.  It has been suggested that high 
levels of debt may reduce the agency problems associated with excess free cash flow 
(Hart and Moore 1995; Novaes, 2003; Stulz, 1990).  For these reasons, the acquiring 
firm’s managers may prefer to use cash (whether internally generated or raised by 
debt financing) to fund an acquisition rather than issuing new equity to directly pay 
for the acquisition.  Hence, we hypothesize that there is a positive relationship be-
tween a hospitality firm’s use of debt (via the debt ratio) and the use of cash to pay for 
an acquisition. 
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H2: There is a significant positive relationship between the acquirer’s use of cash 
financing in an acquisition and the acquirer’s debt ratio. 
Justification:  This may result from firms preferring to use cash raised via debt for fi-
nancing an acquisition rather than issuing new shares of stock to use in payment.   
 
Cash Financing and Growth Opportunities 
For firms with a significant number of positive NPV projects, cash holdings 
tend to increase as the number of strong growth opportunities grows (Opler, Pinko-
witz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999).  The reason for this is that if firms with many posi-
tive NPV investment opportunities confront a cash shortage, they may have to forgo 
some of those value-creating projects.  Hence, there may be a strong incentive for 
hospitality firms with more internal growth opportunities to hold significant cash bal-
ances so that they have the flexibility to pursue positive NPV investments, even in the 
face of capital market-rationing.  This may lead such hospitality firms to use stock 
payment in acquisitions to conserve cash for their growth opportunities.  In support of 
this, Martin (1996) showed that acquiring firms with few positive NPV investment 
opportunities tend to finance acquisitions with cash, while those with a high number 
of positive NPV investment opportunities tend to pay with stock.    
In the lodging industry, growth enhancement has been one of the leading stated 
objectives in lodging acquisitions (Kwansa, 1994; Kim and Olsen, 1999).  In addition, 
both restaurant and lodging firms look at acquisitions as a way to increase their mar-
ket share in an environment of high competition and high development costs (Harford, 
forthcoming).  Hence, acquisitions in the hospitality industry may be driven more by 
the lack of internal growth opportunities of the acquiring firms than by other factors 
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(Harford, 2005; Kim and Olsen, 1999; Kwansa, 1994). This would suggest that such 
hospitality firms would tend to use cash payments instead of using stock in their ac-
quisitions.   On this basis, we hypothesize that the level of internal growth opportuni-
ties should be inversely related to the use of cash financing in hospitality acquisitions. 
 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between the acquirer’s use of cash 
financing in an acquisition and the acquirer’s internal growth opportunities. 
Justification:  When acquiring firms have poor internal investment opportunities, the 
cash and cash flow of the acquiring firm may be used to finance acquisitions rather 
than holding the cash or paying it out as a dividend.  On the other hand, firms with a 
high level of internal growth opportunities may conserve cash to be able to take ad-
vantage of their internal growth opportunities and hence use stock financing in an ac-
quisition. 
 
Cash Financing and Firm Size 
Another factor that may affect a hospitality firm’s choice of payment type in 
an acquisition is the firm’s size.  Previous research has shown in general that small 
firms tend to have larger cash holdings and more limited access to the capital markets 
than larger firms (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999). We hypothesize that 
for these reasons, smaller firms may be more likely to make cash acquisition offers 
than larger firms.  Larger firms, having on average lower relative cash levels and eas-
ier access to financial markets, may be more inclined to use stock for payment in an 
acquisition instead of cash.  This leads us to hypothesize an inverse relationship be-
tween firm size and the use of cash payment in hospitality acquisitions. 
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H4: There is a significant negative relationship between the acquirer’s use of cash 
financing in an acquisition and the acquirer’s size. 
Justification:  Smaller firms tend to hold relatively larger cash balances than larger 
firms and often have less access to capital markets than larger firms (Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson, 1999).  Thus, smaller firms may be more likely to depend on 
cash financing of their acquisitions than would larger firms. 
 
Data & Methodology 
Acquiring Firms 
The sample of acquiring firms was drawn from the Securities Data Corpora-
tion (SDC) International Merger and Acquisition Database (SDC-IMAD) for the pe-
riod 1980–2004.  Data in the database range from 1980 to 2004.  To be included in the 
study sample, the observations had to satisfy the following conditions:  1) both the 
acquiring firm and the target were classified as belonging to one of the following SIC 
codes––5812 (restaurant) or 7011(hotel); 2) the transaction was successfully com-
pleted; and 3) the payment type was all cash or all stock.  All cash and all stock deals 
paid 100% of stock or cash to the target, respectively.  Also, since firm-related vari-
ables for this study were drawn from the Compustat Industrial Annual Files, the ac-
quirer and the acquired firm had to be listed in the Compustat database.   
Although the SDC database provides 1,522 hospitality acquisition observa-
tions for the period 1980–2004, only 363 observations (all cash or all stock payment) 
were used in the analysis due to the lack of corresponding data in the Compustat In-
dustrial Annual Files (Table 1).  An additional 43 observations were paid by a mix of 
cash and stock and hence were excluded.   
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Methodology 
The sample of hospitality acquiring firms was divided into two groups by 
payment type (cash or stock).  Since the dependent variable is the payment type, 
which was a categorical dummy variable, and the independent variables are metric 
accounting variables having to do with the firm’s characteristics, binary logistic re-
gression was used (Hair, Anderson, Tathan and Black, 1998).  Previous studies (Mar-
tin, 1996; Opler and Titman, 1993) reported in the acquisition literature have also 
used logistic regression with categorical dependent variables.  In binary logistic re-
gression, the dependent variable is assigned a one or a zero.  In this study the depend-
ent variable was 1 if the payment method of the acquisition was cash and 0 if the 
payment method was stock.   All of the independent variables were calculated using 
data from the fiscal year prior to the takeover announcement date. 
The analysis was initially done for the whole sample (restaurants plus hotels).  
In addition, two subsamples were created-one consisting of the hotel subgroup and the 
other of the restaurant subgroup and the same analysis was performed on each of the 
two subgroups.  The intent in doing this was to see if similar variables impacted the 
subgroups in the same way that they did the overall sample. Since cash financing is 
predominant in both subsamples, if there was little difference between the subsample 
and overall results, it would suggest that the significant variables in the models would 
represent a general hospitality industry characteristic. 
The first independent variable, free cash flow, was calculated by dividing 
cash and short-term investments by total sales (Harford, 1999; Lang, Stulz and Walk-
ling, 1991).  Free cash flow calculations were made over the fiscal year prior to the 
takeover announcement date.  We also used other free cash flow measurements (oper-
ating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividend 
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and common dividends by total assets, cash and short-term investments dividend by 
total assets).  The results were similar. 
The second independent variable, the debt ratio, was the ratio of the book 
value of debt to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt (Har-
ford, 1999). 
The third independent variable, growth opportunities, was defined as capital 
expenditures-to-total sales and capital expenditures-to-total assets (Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Dalbor and Upneja, 2004). Since there is support for 
both versions of this variable in the literature, we tested each one in the empirical 
analysis.  We also used the pseudo Q as growth opportunities.  The results turned out 
to be insignificant.  This may be due to inaccurate measurement of the replacement 
value of assets in Tobin’s Q.   
The fourth variable, firm size, was calculated as the log of the book value of 
total assets (Harford, 1999).  
Results 
Table 2 shows the mean value of the study variables for the cash and for the 
stock payment offer samples.  T-statistics were used to measure the significance of the 
difference in the means of firm characteristics between those firms that made cash ac-
quisitions and those that made stock acquisitions.  While capital expenditures-to-
assets (growth opportunity proxy), size, and the debt ratio were significantly different 
at the 1% level, capital & short-term investment-to-sales (free cash flow proxy) was 
only significant at the 5% level.  
Table 3 presents the binary logistic regression results for the full sample with 
two versions of the growth opportunities variable (Models 1 and 2).  A previous study 
(Dalbor and Upneja, 2004) showed inconsistent result for the two growth opportuni-
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ties.  Table 4 shows a binary logistic regression with the same variables for the two 
sample subsets representing the hotel (Model 3) and the restaurant (Model 4) indus-
tries. For the hotel industry, press’s Q statistic is 85.90 which is more significant than 
the critical value at a significance level of 0.01.  For the hotel industry, a prediction 
accuracy of 84% (cash payment) would be acceptable because it is above 73.56% 
proportional chance criterion (C pro).  For the overall logistic results all four models 
showed significant results (Tables 3 and 4), all of the models had large p-values for 
the Deviance test (Model 4’s value was lower but the results were still significant).  In 
the Deviance test, the higher the p-value, the better the logistic regression model fits 
the data. A low p-value implies that the predicted probabilities deviate from the ob-
served probabilities (see Minitab 14.20).  For the four models the correctly predicted 
probabilities ranged from 76% to 87% indicating that the models represent the overall 
inferred relationship well.  In Table 5, the result of ordinal logistic regression with all 
three payment types (cash, mixed and stock) has opposite sign to Table 3 and Table 4.  
Size and debt are negatively related to cash financing.  Mixed payment may not be de-
termined by hypotheses.  The classification rate is 73 percent.            
In terms of the logistic results, free cash flow did not appear to be a signifi-
cant determinant of the type of payment used in acquisitions in the hospitality indus-
try as a whole or in the individual hotel and restaurant subsamples (Tables 3 and 4).  
This result differs from previous studies in the general finance literature that looked 
across aggregated data for a number of different industries (see, for example, Lang, 
Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Martin, 1996).  The hospitality free cash flow results sug-
gest that there may be important differences between the hospitality industry and oth-
er industries in terms of how hospitality firms view and use free cash flow. 
We found positive significant coefficients for the debt ratio in all four models.  
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This is consistent with the original hypothesis.  Thus, hospitality-acquiring firms with 
larger debt ratios and hence more of their capitals raised as debt are more likely to use 
cash than stock payments in their acquisitions (Brealey and Myers, 2001).  The debt 
ratio results using the full hospitality industry sample (Table 3) were consistent with 
the results for the two industry segments (Table 4).   
The coefficient of the capital expenditure-to-assets ratio was negative and  
only marginally significant (0.09 p level) in the overall model (Model 2, Table 3).  
The capital expenditures-to-sales ratio was not significant as shown in Model 1.  This 
result offers only very weak support for Hypothesis 3 - hospitality-acquiring firms 
with low internal growth opportunities are more likely to pay cash for their acquisi-
tions.   When analyzing the results by industry segment (Table 4), the capital expendi-
ture-to-assets ratio was insignificant for both the hotel industry and the restaurant in-
dustry subsamples.  Thus, the weak results for the overall model are not supported in 
the subsample analysis.  This evidence suggests that a hospitality firm’s internal 
growth opportunities are not meaningfully related to its choice of payment type in an 
acquisition. 
The coefficient for the size term is positive and significant in both Models 1 
and 2 (Table 3) for the overall sample.  However, the sign of the size coefficient is 
opposite to the predicted direction.  Thus, larger hospitality-acquiring firms are more 
likely than are smaller firms to use cash rather than stock payment in an acquisition.  
The subsample results shed more light on this finding.  When the two industry sub-
samples were examined, the hotel industry subsample size variable had an insignifi-
cant coefficient (Model 3, Table 4). In contrast, the size coefficient for the restaurant 
industry subsample was positive and strongly significant.  Hence, the overall sample 
results appear to have resulted from the tendency to use of cash payments in an acqui-
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sition in the restaurant industry, with this tendency being positively and strongly re-
lated to firm size.  Why the results differ for the hotel and restaurant industry subsam-
ples is unclear.  It could be due to the smaller sample size for the hotel subsample or 
to some fundamental difference between the behaviors of hotel and restaurant firms. 
In addition, possible explanations for the positive coefficient of the restaurant sub-
sample could be the existing restaurant owners’ control issues (preferring not to issue 
new stock) or the fact that larger restaurant firms find it easier to accumulate the large 
amounts of cash needed to finance an acquisition.  
 
Discussion and Significance 
This study used a dataset that contained twenty-five years of information 
about the hotel and restaurant industry.  Previous hospitality studies had not used this 
database to examine this long-term period.  When hospitality acquirers’ managers 
need to make a decision about payment type in mergers and acquisitions, they can 
look to the results from this study.  Hotel and restaurant acquirers with higher debt are 
more likely to use cash.  Larger restaurant acquirers tend to use cash.  Free cash flow 
and growth opportunities are not significantly related to the choice of payment type in 
the hotel and restaurant industries.  The difference between hotel and restaurant indus-
tries in payment type needs to be analyzed in the future study.  Industry influence on 
acquisition activity should also be examined. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for future study 
For twenty-five years, cash has been the dominant method of payment in 
hospitality acquisitions.  Our overall results show that hospitality acquirers are more 
likely to use cash rather than stock in acquisitions the higher their when they have a 
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higher debt ratio; the same is true for, restaurant companies that are larger in size.  
Neither free cash flow nor internal growth opportunities appear to be significantly re-
lated to the payment type used in a hospitality acquisition.   
The results of this study suggest potential areas for further research.  First, 
since the use of cash acquisition payments is positively associated with the acquiring 
hospitality firm’s debt ratio, more cash payment acquisitions may occur during eco-
nomic periods when interest rates are low and debt financing is easily obtained.  Sec-
ond, it would be interesting to explore the characteristics that differ between the hotel 
and the restaurant industries that lead restaurant firm size to be positively related to 
the use of cash payments for an acquisition.  Greater understanding of this finding 
may reveal different critical characteristics of each segment.  Another interesting area 
of exploration may be whether there are any differences in the longer-run perform-
ance of hospitality firms that use cash payments in acquisitions versus the longer-run 
performance of firms that use stock payments due to the undervaluation of the ac-
quirer’s stocks.  Given the preponderance of cash payments (as opposed to stock) in 
acquisitions in the hospitality industry one might expect that the decision to use cash 
payments would lead to superior long run firm performance.  Also it is important to 
know whether social value is improved through mergers.  Finally, the effect of re-
structuring between two firms in the same industry needs to be analyzed.     
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Table 1. Number of Acquisition Deals in Hospitality Industry  
 
 
Year Total  
All 
cash 
All 
stock 
Mix of 
cash and 
stock 
1980 1 0 0 1 
1981 4 2 1 1 
1982 8 6 1 1 
1983 22 18 3 1 
1984 11 7 0 4 
1985 9 7 2 0 
1986 4 1 0 3 
1987 7 6 1 0 
1988 6 5 0 1 
1989 9 5 2 2 
1990 6 4 1 1 
1991 9 6 1 2 
1992 12 9 3 0 
1993 20 12 5 3 
1994 25 16 6 3 
1995 31 20 9 2 
1996 42 29 8 5 
1997 48 38 6 4 
1998 39 35 2 2 
1999 33 28 3 2 
2000 17 13 2 2 
2001 7 6 1 0 
2002 19 16 0 3 
2003 9 8 1 0 
2004 8 8 0 0 
total 406 305 58 43 
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Table 2. Mean Value of Variables for the Two Payment Types 
Payment Type Stock  Cash  
Comparison 
of Means 
Number of acquisitions 58   305     
              
  mean s.d. mean s.d. T-stat  p-value 
Cash & short-term investment-to-sales 
(proxy for free cash flow) 0.77 3.50 0.64 4.10 0.03 0.85 
Capital expenditure-to-sales (proxy for 
growth opportunities) 0.42 1.77 0.18 0.21 ** 5.7 0.02 
Capital expenditure-to-assets (proxy for 
growth opportunities) 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.10 *** 31.18 0.00 
Size 1.85 0.75 2.57 0.83 *** 39.41 0.00 
Debt Ratio 0.20 0.21 0.39 0.24 *** 32.94 0.00 
**, ***: significant at 5% and 1% level  
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Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression with Full Sample # 
Dependent Variable: 1 = cash, 0 = stock  
  Model 1     Model 2     
Number of observations cash = 207 , stock = 51 cash = 207, stock = 51 
  coefficient p-value Z coefficient p-value Z 
Constant -1.34 0.02 -2.42 -0.78 0.24 -1.19 
Cash & short-term in-
vestment-to-sales (proxy 
for free cash flow) 0.18 0.51 0.66 0.03 0.62 0.50 
Capital expenditure-to-
sales (proxy for growth 
opportunities) -1.34 0.16 -1.40    
Capital expenditure-to-
assets (proxy for 
growth opportunities) 
   * -2.46 0.09 -1.72 
Size *** 1.02 0.00 4.03 *** 0.88 0.00 3.56 
Debt ratio *** 3.06 0.00 3.46 *** 2.77 0.00 3.04 
            
Goodness-of-fit test chi-sq p-value   Chi-sq p-value   
Deviance 198.45 0.42   201.29 0.36   
% correctly classified 78.8     78.5     
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
#: Number of observation differs in each regression due to missing variables. 
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Table 4. Binary Logistic Regression by Industry # 
Dependent Variable: 1 = cash, 0 = stock     
  Hotel Industry Only   Restaurant Industry Only 
  Model 3    Model 4    
Number of observa-
tions cash = 61, stock = 5   cash = 146, stock = 46 
  coefficient p-value Z coefficient p-value z 
Constant 0.97 0.64 0.46 -0.97 0.18 -1.33 
Cash & short-term in-
vestment-to-sales  
(proxy for free cash 
flow) -0.14 0.89 -0.14 0.08 0.59 0.53 
Capital expenditure-to-
assets (proxy for 
growth opportunities) -9.03 0.15 -1.44 -2.06 0.18 -1.35 
Size -0.21 0.77 -0.30 *** 0.99 0.00 3.51 
Debt *** 10.17 0.03 2.17 *** 2.16 0.03 2.21 
            
Goodness-of-fit test chi-sq p-value   chi-sq p-value   
Deviance 16.88 1.00   175.76 0.07   
% correctly classified 87.5     76.4     
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
#: Number of observations differs in each regression due to missing variables. 
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Appendix 
Table 5. Ordinal Logistic Regression with stock, mixed and cash payment 
Dependent Variable: 1=stock   2=mixed  3=cash 
     
  Model 5    Model 6    
Number of observa-
tions 
cash = 207, stock = 51, 
mixed = 43   cash =207, stock =51, mixed=43 
  coefficient p-value Z coefficient p-value z 
Constant 1 0.46 0.32 0.99 -0.58 0.31 -1.01 
Constant 2 ***1.25 0.01 2.70 0.23 0.69 0.04 
Cash & short-term in-
vestment-to-total as-
sets   (proxy for free 
cash flow) -0.06 0.95 -0.06 1.08 0.19 1.30 
Capital expenditure-to-
sales (proxy for 
growth opportunities) 0.09 0.25 1.16    
Capital expenditure-to-
assets (proxy for 
growth opportunities)    ***2.98 0.01 2.67 
Size ***-0.75 0.00 -4.44 ***-0.61 0.00 -3.57 
Debt ***-2.18 0.00 -3.54 ***-1.70 0.01 -2.66 
            
Goodness-of-fit test chi-sq p-value   chi-sq p-value   
Deviance 477.8 1.00  472.8 1.000   
% correctly classified 73.1   73.9    
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
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